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IV. THE MEXICAN ELECTION
SYSTEM AS A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
Perspective from the Right: National
Action Party ("PAN")
JAVIER LIVAS*
I. MExIco: GOVERNED BY LIARS AND CHEATS
"Mexico is the perfect dictatorship," said Mario Vargas Llosa,
a Latin-American writer, not long ago. I want to add that "the
perfect dictatorship" is kept as such by liars and cheats.
I am well aware that this assertion sounds rather insulting, but
I make it to illustrate a point. I know I am at a law school sur-
rounded by lawyers and law professors, and, therefore, I feel obli-
gated to give proof of what I am saying.
Article 128 of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United
States requires all public servants, without exception, to take a spe-
cial oath of office whereby they swear to "uphold the Constitution
and the laws that emanate from it."1
Articles 39 and 40 of the Constitution define the origin and
essence of the Constitution. Article 39 states: "National sover-
eignty resides essentially and originally in the people. All public
power derives from the people and is instituted for their benefit.
The people have the inalienable right to alter or modify their form
of government."'2 In turn, Article 40 of the Constitution states: "It
is the will of the Mexican people to constitute themselves into a
* Javier Livas is legal counsel to the National Action Party. He has a law degree
from the University of Nuevo Le6n and an MBA from the Monterrey Institute of Technol-
ogy. He was elected president of the PAN in San Pedro in 1992. Son of a former PRI
Governor of Nuevo Le6n and co-founder of the Mexico-United States Institute, he has
written several books on law and politics. He is currently a weekly columnist with the
prestigious independent newspaper El None.
1. CONsT. art. 128 (Mex.).
2. Id. art. 39.
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representative, democratic and federal republic, made up of free
and sovereign States in all matters concerned with their internal
regime, but united in a federation established according to the
principles of this fundamental law."'3
In so far as government officials promise to uphold the Consti-
tution and do not do so, they are liars. In so far as they establish a
parallel order and other laws that contradict the spirit of the Con-
stitution as a means to preserve their own power or that of the
group they belong to, they are cheats.
They are also liars and cheats when they arrange electoral
fraud and deny its existence. The whole world knows what is going
on, but Mexican government officials will not acknowledge this
publicly as a problem. They only talk in terms of how much we
have advanced in perfecting our democracy. One is left to wonder,
if so much advancement has been going on for so long, and we
never get anywhere, then where were we when we started moving
forward?
The truth is that our government officials change the electoral
laws marginally and deceitfully, thereby shifting attention away
from demands for real change; they are only "hustling" for ways to
remain in power.
Maybe these lies become laws because very few oppose them.
Maybe the reason for this is that there are not enough brave demo-
crats in Mexico. But perhaps it is also true that their numbers are
small because the people have learned to fear their government.
Maybe someone from America's Watch can comment on how this
could be happening. Could it be that there are people interested in
turning us into a country of cowards and submissives?
Having untruthful people in public office is certainly bad, but
when, in addition to this, these people are cheats, it is much worse.
A liar can be voted out of office, but the same does not hold true
for a cheat. The trickster will set his mind on trying to hold on to
office by whatever means possible.
An extralegal order outside the Constitution has been created
and fostered in Mexico. The electoral laws have been structured to
achieve this unlawful purpose.
This was done recently by adding a new paragraph to Article
41 that says: "The organization of federal elections is a State func-
3. Id art. 40.
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tion that is exercised by the legislative and executive branches of
the Union, with the participation of national political parties and
the citizens in accordance of the Law."'4 It sounds as if the PRI-
government believes that this amendment gives it the right to guide
elections, depriving the people of their inalienable rights.
Article 40, mentioned above, has also been perverted. Let's
examine, one by one, the concepts there contained.
II. REPUBLIC?
Why is Mexico not a republic?
A. Power Renovation
Mexico is not a republic because the essence of a republic is
the renovation of those holding power, and this does not happen in
Mexico-at least not in real terms. The Government reelects itself
using the official party, the Party of the Institutional Revolution
("PRI"), as its electoral agency.
B. PRI Monopoly of Electoral Laws
The PRI's monopoly of the electoral laws undermines Mex-
ico's ability to be a republic. The PRI was born a majority party in
1929. It conducts itself as the inheritor of the Mexican Revolution
and claims the right to administer the revolutionary process. It has
used its original majority in both Houses of Congress to approve
electoral laws that assure the party stays in power.
C. Protection of the PRI's Dominance
The laws also protect the PRI's dominance. Even during the
1950s, when opposition was indeed minor, the PRI had the intelli-
gence to grant itself access to enter Congress through a propor-
tional representation method. By anticipating events, the PRI
managed to build and strengthen a more-or-less loyal opposition
that it got to know well, and brought the opposition into the unique
rules of play that the PRI was preparing. In the meantime, the
Government and its party, the PRI, held on to a very safe and
overwhelming majority, and kept for itself the last word on every
conceivable political decision.
4. Id. art. 41.
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It is undeniable that a single party has remained in power for
over sixty years. This single-party rule has not survived that of the
Russian communist party just by chance. The PRI has been dis-
honest, but nobody can say that it has not been smart. This be-
comes particularly clear if we follow the events that led to the
enactment of the so-called "governability clause."
When the Constitution was reformed to allow the new Federal
Electoral Code ("CFE") in 1987, then-President Miguel de la Ma-
drid proposed a change that, when put into law, would give auto-
matic majority control to the party that won the highest number of
seats in the House of Representatives in the direct, relative-major-
ity electoral contests. I must point out that this occurred shortly
after the PRI-government went through the Nuevo Le6n elections
in 1985 and the Chihuahua elections in 1986, in which the PAN
candidates had an unprecedented and visible popular support to
which the Government responded with a scandalous fraud of inter-
national fame.
So it is reasonable to infer that the Government foresaw that
something bad was likely to happen, and, thus, created the
governability clause. It was on target because, in the 1988 Presi-
dential elections, the whole political system collapsed to the
ground. The PRI suffered the resignation of Cuauht6moc CArde-
nas, Porfirio Mufioz Ledo, and other PRI members, and witnessed
an increased challenge coming from the conservative PAN and its
national candidate, Manuel Clouthier, a businessman from the
State of Sinaloa.
The fraud of the July 1988 elections was enormous. The PRI
machinery went full speed ahead in spite of the figures produced
by chicanery that amounted to barely 50.74% of total votes. But
nobody believed those results.
Carlos Salinas took office in the midst of many unanswered
questions. Thus, he promised in-depth political reform; however,
he did not deliver. Conveniently, for the first time in history, the
President did not send the political reform initiative himself;
rather, it was the PRI that sent it. The new proposed reform gave
the party gaining a simple plurality in the direct vote for Congress
the right to half the seats plus one in that body. Given the circum-
stances, this reform meant that the PRI would assure itself control
of the Congress in the next elections.
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The PAN is often mistakenly blamed for having approved the
governability clause. The truth is that the governability clause was
installed in the Constitution by the 1987 political reform package
that was criticized and opposed by the PAN at the time. The polit-
ical reform of 1989 was approved by the PAN under the assump-
tion that it was better than remaining under the aegis of the 1987
reform and the CFE. I do not deny that the PAN's decision to go
along with the PRI's 1989 proposal has many delicate and equivo-
cal aspects. At this time, however, I cannot comment on this issue
because of the lack of time.
D. Federal Funding
The law gives more money to the PRI than to all other polit-
ical parties combined. This is another competitive advantage that
the PRI has institutionalized for its own benefit. When it comes to
getting official subsidies, the PRI gets the lion's share.
The Government has worked out the subsidies given by law in
such a way that gives the PRI a bigger share than any other party.
This can be calculated from the content of Article 49 of the Federal
Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures ("COFIPE") that
approves subsidies in accordance with the electoral results of previ-
ous elections.5
Through this formula, and in a very legal fashion, the official
party found the avenue to put a stop to the public outcry against
the PRI's known practice of putting its hand into the Govern-
ment's coffers. The PRI can now cover up its fraudulent practices
through an open subsidy law that they themselves passed through
Congress. This allowance upholds the PRI's advantage by giving it
resources in proportion to the numerical advantage it already had.
Of course, this is done without considering the illegitimacy of the
votes used to calculate the initial allocation.
III. A FEDERATION OF DEPENDENT STATES?
Now, let us turn our attention to another matter.
Why is Mexico not a federation of states?
Mexico is not a federation of states because a federation, by
definition, is an agreement among truly free and sovereign states.
5. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 49 (Mex.).
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In Mexico, the states are in many ways subject to a central
authority.
A. Economic Dependence
In terms of budget and resources, the taxes providing the high-
est income to the Government are federal taxes that are shared
according to an agreement with the states. Income tax, value-ad-
ded tax, special taxes on consumption such as car ownership, tele-
phone, gasoline, tobacco, and liquor, and taxes on imports and
exports are all federal taxes. There are no income taxes or sales
taxes coming from the State legislature because the Federal Gov-
ernment strong-armed the states into accepting these arrangements
and the resulting concentration of income at the federal level.
States and municipalities are thus left to collect some real property
taxes and other income from driver's license fees, administrative
fees, and penalties.
Less collection means less financial autonomy and less capac-
ity to build public works. Less income also means less money to
spend and invest.
On the spending side, there is the Programa Nacional de
Solidaridad ("PRONASOL"), a federal program of subsidies that
deprives the states of up to one half of their truly disposable in-
come, which is often as little as 10% of total resources available.
The states use 90% of their income to pay for expenses such as
education, public safety, healthcare, transportation, gasoline, office
supplies, etc. For example, in the case of the State of Nuevo Le6n,
the Federal Government, working through the PRONASOL pro-
gram, takes 5% of the budget for its activities. Thus, the state is
left with one out of every twenty pesos for investment, a truly ridic-
ulous figure. It suffices to say that the Federal Government keeps
about 85% of all taxes collected at the national level, and all the
states, including the municipalities and Mexico City itself, have to
make ends meet on the remaining 15%. The states, of course, are
not capable of doing so. Thus, they are in a perpetual state of eco-
nomic ruin and are dependent on Presidential favors to obtain fed-
eral investment.
All of these arrangements are to be found in laws and agree-
ments between the Federal Government and the state
governments.
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B. Federal Election Law Influence
Mexico is not a federation of states because federal electoral
laws contaminate the state electoral laws. Electoral laws are not
independently drafted; rather, they are imitations of federal laws.
In Mexico, the three levels of government- federal, state, and mu-
nicipal-serve only one purpose, to allow federal law to smother
state law. This overlapping of jurisdictions enhances the prepon-
derance of federal authorities and the official party.
Some months ago, we (a group working for democracy) had a
congress to compare state electoral laws. The findings confirmed
our suspicions. State electoral laws follow the model of the federal
electoral codes. Some of these local laws have adopted, with small
variations, the solutions proposed by the CFE; others have suffered
the influence of the newer COFIPE. Still others remain under the
influence of the Law for Political Organizations and Electoral
Processes, which goes back to the times of President Lopez Por-
tillo. Not one single state law places the control of its electoral
process in the hands of an organization that is not controlled by
law or by virtual majority by the PRI. The presidency of these or-
ganizations is almost invariably in the hands of the lieutenant gov-
ernor, who is directly appointed by the Governor. Similarly, at the
federal level, the Secretary of Governance (a key internal security
body) has been presiding over the main electoral body at the fed-
eral level for decades. This body still exists, although it is now
called the Federal Electoral Institute ("IFE").
The laws and the organizations change names, but the mecha-
nisms of control remain the same. Lying is the PRI's main political
weapon.
C. Presidencialismo
The government officials abide by the rules of presidencial-
ismo, not by the laws they swear to obey. The golden rule of pre-
sidencialismo is called "el dedazo."6 The Governors are recipients
of el dedazo when they are hand-picked or designated by the Presi-
dent to become candidates of the PRI. These are sufficiently im-
portant jobs as to require the President's direct involvement in
each decision. It is a function that is not delegated or entrusted to
6. El dedazo is a colloquial expression for the process whereby the President hand-
picks individuals for key political positions. "Dedo" literally translates as "finger."
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anyone else. While this is a despicable practice, the effect it has on
creating a submissive and undignified Governor are still more
despicable.
In the case of the voter registration lists, for example, the Gov-
ernor's submissiveness has resulted in the state legislatures' inclu-
sion in their electoral law of authorization for the State Electoral
Commission to reach agreements with the National Voter Registry
to use the federal voter registration list. This agreement is always
carried out in the expected manner. All the states use the federal
voter's list. They no longer have offices to make their own lists.
The enrollment and cancellations are managed by a computer in
Mexico City.
In one instance that I became personally aware of, the state
electoral law was simply put to shame. This happened in the State
of San Lufs Potosi in the 1991 gubernatorial elections, when Dr.
Salvador Nava was a candidate. Perhaps due to a mistake during
the copying of the law, or for whatever reason, the state electoral
law said that the federal voter list could be used but that a new
additional list should be compiled to complement the federal one.
This obligation was never fulfilled and the election was almost an-
nuled, but nobody even noticed the fault. The election was carried
out following the federal rules only.
After seeing this happen, can we still call this country a
federation?
IV. DEMOCRACY?
Why is it clear that this is no democracy?
A. Election Fixing
Mexico is clearly not a democracy because a democracy means
a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. In
a democracy, everything is done through clean and reliable electo-
ral processes.
In Mexico, elections are rigged. The votes are either not
counted or are bought by the Government. Elections are organ-
ized by the Government for its own benefit. The Government
dominates the integration of the different electoral bodies. At the
local level, electoral laws are drifting slowly in the direction of the
COFIPE. But let us note that the recent code is nothing to
emulate.
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The COFIPE furnishes the organizations of the IFE. Under
the COFIPE, the IFE's general council is to be presided by the
Secretary of Governance, the President's appointee. This is set
forth in Article 74, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the COFIPE.7 The advi-
sor-magistrates, supposedly learned and independent figures, are
to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the
House of Representatives. It turns out, however, that the law pro-
vides for the President of the Republic to furnish the names of the
candidates for magistrates. Out of eighteen candidates, six must be
nominated; then, a ridiculous formula is applied whereby if some
or all are not approved, the result is decided by chance from the list
of eighteen. This is an absurd mechanism, provided by law, that
allows the President, the person making the original selection, to
make the ultimate decision regardless of what Congress decides.
This does not really provide for a choice.
Presidencialismo also manifests itself at the polling place level.
Any of the electoral laws we consider have the same solution. The
president of the polling place has absolute power over events in his
polling place. According to Article 198 of the CFE,8 Article 122 of
the COFIPE,9 or any of thirty-one state laws, the president of the
polling place, or casilla, is the only one who will identify the voters,
take their voting cards, sign tally sheets, authenticate papers, keep
the peace, call in the police, dismiss representatives, suspend or
restart voting, and bring the materials needed to set up the polling
place. He is also the one responsible to take the ballots to the
Commission after the election is over. Federal authorities only
have to name the right person for the job, and he will produce the
desired results.
B. Lack of Judicial Review
Mexico is clearly not a democracy because democracy implies
the rule of law and an impartial system of justice through the work
of honest tribunals.
Mexico has no judicial review of electoral events. The Consti-
tution itself is silent on this matter. Article 107, which sets up the
famous Judicio de Amparo (a unique federal constitutionality pro-
7. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 74, paras. 1-2 (Mex.).
8. C.F.E. art. 122 (Mex.).
9. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 122 (Mex.).
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ceeding or trial),10 has limited effects in other matters. The Article
states: "The resolution shall always be such that it will only refer to
private individuals, limiting itself to protect them in the case in
question, but without making a special declaration about the law or
act that generated it."11 In addition to this general limitation, the
Mexican Supreme Court has made it clear that electoral rights are
not included in the first twenty-nine articles of the Constitution.
They are not individual rights and are, therefore, not protected by
the Amparo trial.
C. Limited Electoral Tribunal Power
The powers of the recently created electoral tribunals are lim-
ited in two different ways.
1. Rules of Evidence
The rules of evidence in cases before the electoral tribunal in-
volving accusation of electoral fraud are such that they are limited
to public documents. These public documents consist only of those
signed by a public official, a notary, or an election official. This
translates into a whole range of absurdities. For instance, if all the
voters of a precinct gather and allege that the voting did not even
take place at all, their declaration cannot be considered as evidence
by the tribunal. On the contrary, if two corrupt election officials
hide in a garage and invent a tally sheet and sign it, this public
document is enough to certify the election. This absurd proposi-
tion prompted me to speak about the possibility of a new mode of
elections that I call "desktop elections" (invented tally sheets).
Many of the 1988 results of the Presidential elections that gave
Salinas his victory were, indeed, desktop elections. This explains
why the packages with election results were never opened for in-
spection at the electoral college. The PRI majority ordered the
army into the Legislative Palace to guard the packages and prevent
the Congressmen from performing their legal duty. This is an ex-
ample of how the PRI understands the majority rule. There are
many instances at the state legislative level where the same kind of
arbitrary behavior has been observed.
10. CONST. art. 107 (Mex.).
11. Id.
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2. Limited Effect of Tribunal Rulings
The effects of the rulings of the electoral tribunals are very
limited. The decisions can be revoked by (1) the organ overseeing
the final qualifying of the election, (2) the electoral college if it is a
national level election, or (3) the local legislature if it is a state
level election.
The only possible conclusion to draw from this is that the in-
clusion of an electoral tribunal in the electoral laws has been a ma-
neuver to draw attention away from other, more important events
at the close of an electoral period. Nobody I know asked for an
electoral tribunal. It is well known that no election will be decided
by a tribunal. The only tribunal is the people, and it has to have
the chance to choose its government in an orderly procedure from
start to finish.
V. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT?
Why doesn't Mexico have a representative government?
A. Citizen Nomination of Candidates
The people are not represented properly because they do not
have the liberty to seek their own representatives. Citizens are not
entitled to be nominated for public office independent of political
parties. There is no mechanism in the law to let this happen. The
possibility of having one's name written hundreds of times in the
candidate write-in space of the ballot is practically nil. Although
ballots have the write-in space, someone winning by using that al-
ternative is only a theoretical possibility, and no more.
The Government has created a monopoly in accessing public
office. Access is given only to political parties. For instance, Arti-
cle 175 of the COFIPE states: "The right to request the registration
of candidates for public office belongs exclusively to the political
parties."'12 The same monopoly exists at the state level where, even
in the case of the smallest municipal mayors, their candidacy must
be registered by a political party.
The requirements that the political parties must meet for such
registration are enormous. Articles 24 to 35 of the COFIPE deal
with this bureaucratic nightmare. 13 So many formalities have to be
12. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 175 (Mex.).
13. 1l arts. 24-35 (Mex.).
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met that no party will ever comply with them: there must be 3,000
members in at least one half of all the states or 300 or more mem-
bers in at least 150 federal electoral districts, and not less than
65,000 in either case. Then, you need to hold an assembly with all
the members at the same time in one place, and the members must
have their voter cards with them. Even the PRD could not comply
with the requirements and had to fuse itself with the PMS party, a
socialist organization.
B. Changes in the Law
Mexico does not have a representative government because
recent changes in the law protect the established system. Modifica-
tions made in the COFIPE were the result of the 1988 election
scare. The COFIPE makes forming alliances and coalitions more
difficult because such alliances and coalitions had enabled opposi-
tion parties to beat the PRI.
Also, in the case of the PRD, the Government prohibited its
use of the colors of the Mexican flag, alleging that those are the
colors of the PRI and that the law requires that each have a distinct
emblem. The IFE council upheld the decision.
VI. INTERNATIONAL MisFIrr
Let us take a few last moments to analyze how the Mexican
Government's obligations toward other nations are evaded.
Mexico ratified the American Convention of Human Rights14
on April 3, 1982.15 One of the obligations set forth in the Conven-
tion is to be respectful of the political rights of the people. Article
23, paragraph (b) of the Convention explicitly addresses the peri-
odic and authentic elections through universal suffrage and secret
voting that guarantees the free will of the voters.16
Mexico has been denounced for violating Article 1 of the Con-
vention by not honoring and protecting the rights and freedoms of
the people17 and for violating Article 2 of the Convention calling
14. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (en-
tered into force July 18, 1978).
15. See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States Is Not a Party,
30 I.L.M. 575 (1991) (listing 22 countries that have ratified the Convention as of 1991).
16. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 14, art. 23(b).
17. Id. art 1.
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for Member States' adoption of necessary legislative or similar
measures to make these freedoms and rights effective.18
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has asked
Mexico to modify its laws to comply with the terms of the Conven-
tion. Mexican officials, however, have chosen not to comply. In
fact, Mexico's ambassadors to the Organization of American States
("OAS") have responded by arguing that (1) the Commission lacks
jurisdiction, (2) the complaints deal with matters that are foreign to
it, (3) internal laws of Mexico cannot be discussed, (4) Mexico's
sovereignty is put at risk, and (5) Mexico has followed internal pro-
ceedings correctly.
Why, then, did Mexico sign the Convention if it never has
made any effort to comply with its terms? It seems that Mexican
officials follow the same pattern of contempt internationally that
they show toward their own people.
The governability clause has also been a ground for denuncia-
tion. I personally presented the Inter-American Commission with
the papers duly signed by a team of independent PAN legislators
from Nuevo Le6n. If the Commission decides to follow its own
precedent relating to a similar clause approved by the dictatorial
regime in Paraguay some years back, then the Commission will
prove us right in the claim that there are serious human rights vio-
lations in Mexico.
18. Id. art 2.
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